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By HUBERT W. SMITH t
To those who have contact with the judicial process, medical science is
symbolic of the whole law-science diathesis. Inept words tend to obscure
the breadth of law-medicine relationships. "Medical jurisprudence" is one
such term. It has been used to describe a variety of things: sometimes
the application of legal doctrine to medical practice, sometimes the special
applications of medical knowledge to evidentiary problems which come
before tribunals of the law. The term "forensic medicine" has a nice
ring, and it is used abroad to signify the specialized applications of medi-
cal science in all varieties of legal proceedings. The American synonym,
"legal medicine," makes the label sharper but raises an unwarranted
inference that ordinary medicine may not be so legitimate. None of these
terms conveys the true spirit or full content of law-medicine relationships,
which in their totality represent social synthesis and correlation of a major
variety. There is no universal authority on "legal medicine." In law-
medicine, as in law-science relationships, we look upon a giant mosaic
built by many hands.
All rules of substantive law assume the existence of basic facts on which
to operate. Let these facts be distorted in their ascertainment, and the
result may be as harsh as if defective legal principles were applied to
agreed facts. For that reason, one signal aid which science may extend
to law lies in the range of what we may call scientific proof. By scientific
proof I mean the use of those scientific means and methods calculated
to enable the accurate ascertainment of ultimate facts, either as a basis
for settling private litigation (evidentiary), or as a means of forming or
orientating legal or social policy (jurisprudential). Scientific proof, so
conceived, goes to the basis of action; it glorifies fact finding functions
and mechanisms, and it sets itself against all species of distortion in ascer-
taining and reporting facts. Its connected findings may well form a
chain of criticism leading from fact to opinion, so tight and so strong
that no speculative opinion can be inserted.'
*A symposium series on law-science problems with particular reference to law-
medicine problems. Editor-in-chief, Hubert W. Smith, Associate in Medical Legal Re-
search, Harvard Law School and Department of Legal Medicine, Harvard Medical
School. LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1930; M.D., Harvard Medical School, 1941.
'Associate in Medical Legal Research, Harvard Law School and Department of
Legal Medicine, Harvard Medical School.
1. The primary ideal of scientific proof is to eliminate error and to secure truth
by the use of all appropriate methods of corroboration, with accent on diverse sources and
types of evidence; the eventual grading of all types of evidence according to relative
probative value; development of usable criteria and safeguards in respect to each type of
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In the evidentiary field, scientific proof will be found to revolve around
problems of identification, problems of causation, and problems of effect.
The specific content of each main series of problems differs according
to the field of substantive law which gives rise to the litigation. Substan-
tive law doctrines operate to specify the essential facts to be proven and
so to determine the relevancy of particular evidence. Despite consider-
able overlapping in type problems and in methods, scientific prouf can
be broken down into categories of clinical forensic medicine, forensic
pathology, and modes and mechanisms of scientific proof.
CLINICAL FORENSIC MEDICINE
Clinical forensic medicine embraces all varieties of medical practice
which may yield evidence relevant to litigated issues by use of those tests
and methods currently employed in diagnosing and treating patients.
The expert witness is a practicing physician or surgeon, or a follower of
one of the several specialties, who usually gains his evidentiary informa-
tion from having examined or treated the party litigant for a non-fatal
injury or disease.' As long ago as 1909, 60 per cent of the cases tried in
Superior Court in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, involved expert tes-
timony, and probably the percentage tends constantly to rise. Personal
injury litigation accounts for a large fraction of these cases, but not for
all of them. Practicing physicians have long been going to court as wit-
nesses in actions brought to set aside wills or deeds for alleged mental
incapacity at the time of execution, or to testify in criminal proceedings
on the subject of the defendant's mental responsibility.
The Problem of Expert Testimony
Difficulties arising from the impact of law and science are caused in
part by stupid or antiquated rules of evidence. In many states, as a result
of ill-conceived "privileged communication" statutes, an unscrupulous
patient can obstruct justice by closing the mouth of his doctor on the
witness stand.3 In most states, the hearsay rule has been carried too far.
evidence; promotion of complete understanding among courts, lawyers and experts of tie
pitfalls and potential errors of each species of evidence in order to enable wise cross-
examination; development of appropriate legal mechanisms and modes of trial; reprcs-i,n
of preconceptions and psychological predilections in the trial process and accentuation of
the logical and scientific aspects of evidence. See Smith, Components of Proof in Legal
Proceedings (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 537.
2. On occasion he may derive his opinion from examinations first made in the cuurse
of preparing himself to testify in court. Still again, under our practice, if he is properly
qualified, he may express an expert opinion on the basis of hypttetical questions put t.)
him by counsel, even though he has no personal knowledge of the case.
3. See Chafee, Privileged Commitnications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by
Closing the Doctor's .Month on the WVitness Stand? (1943) 52 YALE L J. 607, 18 AmiAts
oF INT. MEDicisx 606.
1943]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In others the cause of scientific proof has been obstructed by holding that
taking involuntary body fluid or blood specimens violates the constitu-
tional guarantee against self-incrimination or against unlawful search and
seizure.4 These major vices in technical rules of evidence may soon go
down before the frontal attacks of progressive legal scholars.
5
Part of the difficulty in utilizing expert testimony springs from inade-
quate legal and trial mechanisms. The lay jury is not qualified to deter-
mine scientific issues and much of the continuing friction springs from
this maladjustment of the trier of fact to the questions he decides. At
the present moment, the doctor who goes to court as a witness is made a
participant in a fast-moving adversary proceeding where a premium is
put on quick thinking and categorical responses, and the devil usually gets
the hindmost. If he shows a respectable doubt, his testimony is "con-
jectural"; if he is naYve, he may be trapped; if he has not the precious
power of simplification and the benefit of jury neutrality or sympathy,
he may be misunderstood or misbelieved. If he is an expert on internal
medicine, he may have to stand collateral cross-examination on the con-
figurations of the tibia or some other bone which has no relation to his
proper testimony. He may have to conform what should be a condi-
tional answer to a "yes" or "no" because of the pernicious hypothetical
question system.6 The medical man is primarily interested in treating
and healing and is accustomed to having his opinions received with def-
erence and respect. If, as it is said, five per cent of doctors now do most
of the testifying in court, it is no matter for surprise.
Free selection of medical experts by parties litigant has tended to en-
courage "shopping around" for favorable experts, and this partisan bias
is oftentimes more subtle than outspoken. Courts have plodded along,
quite willing to recognize any holder of an M.D. degree as a universal
expert on science. This naivet6 is surprising, for the same judge who
rules a general practitioner competent on his qualifying or voir dire exam-
ination, will take the train for Mayo Clinic if he stands in personal need
of specialized surgery.
The truth is that legal or forensic medicine calls for a type of knowl-
edge and opinion that is often peripheral and new to the doctor's way of
thinking. He has observed conditions and studied medicine principally
4. See Ladd and Gibson, Legal-Medical Aspects of Blood Tests to Decermiie In-
toxication (1943) 20 VA. L. REv. 749, 18 ANNALS OF INT. MEDICINE 564.
5. See Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Ruiles
of Evidence (1943) 10 U. OF Cui. L. Rrv. 285, 1 CLINICS 1627. See also, Chafee,
loc. cit. supra note 3, and Ladd and Gibson, loc. cit. supra note 4.
6. In the Tuckerman will contest, tried before Judge McKim in Suffolk Probate
Court (Mass.), attorney Robert M. Morse put to Dr. Jelley, a psychiatrist, what is re!
puted to be the longest hypothetical question on record. It concerned the mental condi-
tion of the testator, contained twenty thousand words and required three hours to pro-
pound. The witness answered: "I don't know." (1907) 5 Ohio L. REP. 45.
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in terms of therapeutics. He may have no justifiable opinion as to whether
injury can produce a certain disease or as to the terminal effects in point
of disability. If he has gone to court to accommodate an old patient,
and is qualified on voir dire examination as a thorough-going expert, he
may find it hard to confess the limits of his knowledge.
Suggested Remedies
(1) The Need for Expert Referees.
The relation of injury to disease (proximate causation), and the assess-
ment of terminal disability (fixing damages), pose scientific problems
which should be settled by ex-pert referees-medical specialists drawn
from select panels. No lawyer need fear his immolation with advent of
this change, for he would still participate in the informal hearings of the
referees and have opportunity for his witnesses to be heard. The adver-
sary system would be preserved, but with heavier accent on discovery of
the true facts. Litigants could be hospitalized by the referee, examined
by him or any of his nominees and studied with scientific precision. The
referee could be both a doctor and a lawyer acting to see that evidence was
fully developed while protecting fair hearing to the parties and the sub-
stance of major rules of evidence. All observations and findings would
be reported in a "record," with conclusions listed in a separate section so
as to permit review of the medical evidence. This review should be made
by an appropriate medical expert serving as adviser to the trial judge when
the latter has the medical record presented to him for "confirmation."
Once confirmed, the medical findings should be final and not subject to
disturbance by an appeal court. Confirmations could be resisted or set
aside on grounds of fraud, accident, or mistake, but here the trial judge
would lean on his medical adviser. It is eminently desirable to restrict
review of medical findings to the trial court where proper access can be
had to the litigant for re-examination.'
This device should be the ultimate goal of American jurisprudence. It
would soon break the hold of mere advocacy and of shabby or ill-informed
testimony. It would leave doctors to judge the testimony of doctors, elim-
iate futile efforts of the expert to descend to the lay juror's comprehen-
sion, and whet the interest of all socially minded doctors in the judicial
process. Although the prospect of speedy reform is diminished by pos-
sible resistance of plaintiffs' lawyers, this fear should give way once the
trial lawyer realizes that substantial verdicts will still be obtainable for
genuine injury and that claims based on fraud and malingering will be
7. This device would permit a much closer surveillance of the excessiveness or
inadequacy of monetary awards. The present appellate practice of determining whether
the judicial conscience is "shocked," by looking to see what other courts have upheld in
supposedly similar cases at other times and places involves several undesirable factors.
It is not possible to make "book comparison" of any but the simplest injuries.
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sifted out. The chief and perhaps insurmountable barriers to its realiza-
tion, however, are constitutional guarantees of jury trial.8
(2) Transitional or mid-way reforms not involving constitutional
amendment.
A. Impartial experts appointed by court. A transitional reform would
be some variety of statute authorizing a trial judge to appoint an impar-
tial and qualified man or commission to investigate the physical condition
or mental status of a party litigant. Such appointee would act as an officer
of the court, and not as a privately employed expert. The device would
help escape partisan pressure, give the trial judge a chance to bring in
authoritative consultants, and protect the purity of proof in several
directions. But it would have the defect of keeping lay jurors as final
arbiters of scientific issues. It is shocking for the layman to hear that in
many of our states, as in Texas,' a trial court cannot appoint an impartial
expert in a personal injury case to examine an unwilling plaintiff. Such
a claimant can carry his case through court, to what may be a large ver-
dict, with the defendant unable to secure independent confirmation of the
reality and extent of injury. Fortunately the majority view is contrary,
whether reached by common law, by statute, or under reformed rules of
civil procedure, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1" Massa-
chusetts, one of the first states to provide for pre-trial examinations of
psychiatric cases by impartial experts,11 has found that this method goes
far to cure old evils.1
2
B. Certification of expert witnesses by medical profession as aid to
voir dire examination. The medical profession itself can add some
straws to this broom. One who proposes to use a witness as an expert
must establish his qualifications by preliminary questions. Opposing coun-
sel may cross-examine the alleged expert to test his claims to special knowl-
edge. At the conclusion of this voir dire examination, the trial judge
must say whether the witness is a properly qualified expert, and his ruling
will not be set aside except for substantial abuse of discretion. The medi-
8. Due process clauses, properly construed, require only a fair and regular mode
of procedure and trial, and this need not be by jury. As to whether jury trial can be
validly dispensed with in the trial proper of a criminal case, however serious the offense,
see McGOVNEY, CASES ON CONSITUTIoNAL LAW (2d ed. 1935) 568, n. 7. Most state
constitutions have specific provisions which operate to preserve the right to trial by
jury in cases where it existed at common law.
9. See Austin & N. W. R. R. v. Cluck, 97 Tex. 172, 77 S. W. 403 (1903). This is not
because a defendant has no right to the evidence, says the court, but because no legal
sanction exists for compelling the plaintiff to submit.
10. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934) ; 28 U. S. C. § 723c (1940).
11. See MASS. ANN. LAws (Michie, 1942), c. 123, § 100 A. (The so-called "Briggs"
law).
12. See Overholser, The Briggs Law of Massachusetts: A Review' and an Appraisal
(1935) 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 859.
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cal profession itself could issue certificates of competency to its several
members in respect to testimonial qualifications. If a general practitioner
appeared in court as an authority on neurosurgery, a little probing would
soon show that his own profession did not regard him as a proper expert
witness on that subject. The intelligent trial judge, on conclusion of the
voir dire examination, could rule the proffered witness incompetent with
little fear of reversal by an appeal court.'3 E.en if the witness were al-
lowed to testify, the lack of a certificate would be a proper subject for
comment in arguing upon the weight which the jury should accord his
testimony. No statute would seem to be necessary to enable this salutary
innovation, although legislation empowering state licensing boards to
issue such certificates after due hearing would be preferable. In no case
should the doctor who personally treated a patient be debarred from testi-
fying. The prime purposes of the certificate method would be to grade
competency and to exclude unqualified persons from giving opinion evi-
dence.
C. Surveillance of expert testimony by professional "auditing" com-
mittee. At present some medical witnesses are venturing opinions in court
which they would not assert before medical societies. This double stan-
dard, when it exists, deprives courts of the scientific light they should
have. When a doctor testifies that the moon is made of green cheese, as
occasionally happens, he is either dishonest or ignorant. and should be
disciplined by his professional brethren. In the past there has been no
proper surveillance. Civil trials are attended by little or no publicity, and
the improper medical witness has not had to face the just light of com-
petent criticism. In the science of medicine there is much room for hon-
est difference of opinion and for varying clinical judgments on open sub-
jects. But ultimately we come to outer limits of these justifiable differ-
ences, and no man is entitled to palm off as certainty what medical science
itself knows to be purely conjectural and as yet without adequate proof,
experimental or clinical. The test of improper testimony should be this:
Would medical men competent to speak on the subject in question consider
the evidence given by Dr. X an acceptable view, scientifically, or would
they consider it a prostitution of professional standards?
Each state medical society could appoint an auditing committee, includ-
ing one member of the bar, to sample transcripts of medical testimony at
periodic intervals in the medico-legal cases which reach the appeal courts.
Witnesses found to have departed from professional standards would be
subject to disciplinary action for cause, after due hearing, or to revoca-
tion or curtailment of their certificates as competent expert witnesses.
13. Even if initially he has ruled the witness is competent, the trial judge may re-
verse his ruling in the course of trial and intercept further questions when the trend of
testimony shows the alleged expert to be incompetent. See Carbunneau v. Lachance,
307 Mass. 153, 29 N. E. (2d) 696 (1940).
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The mere presence of this real censorship mechanism would be as valua-
ble as its actual use.
Problems of Mental Responsibility: Rules in McNaghten's Case
In 1843, the House of Lords of the English Parliament called upon
the learned judges to deliver an advisory opinion laying down proper
tests for determining mental responsibility whenever a defendant prose-
cuted for homicide should raise the plea of insanity. In the previous year,
McNaghten had been tried for killing Edward Drummond, whom lie shot
in the back, mistakenly believing he was firing upon Sir Robert Peel.
Drummond was Peel's private secretary, and McNaghten was led to this
violence by clearly substantiated delusions of persecution. He was tried
before Chief Justice Tindal, filed a plea of lunacy, and was acquitted by
the jury, which returned a verdict of "not guilty, on the ground of in-
sanity." The case provoked so much discussion in high quarters that
the judges were called upon to declare, for guidance of courts in future
cases, what a defendant must prove in a homicile prosecution to establish
mental irresponsibility for his act. With frank temerity, the judges laid
down certain principles regarding proof of mental irresponsibility stffi-
cient to constitute a defense to a charge of murder (or other crime) .14
First, the jurors should be instructed that every man is presumed to
be sane until the contrary is proved. Secondly, it must be clearly proved
that the person attempting to establish insanity as a defense was "labour-
ing under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know
it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. .... ,, " And
lastly, if the person accused was laboring under a partial delusion only,
but knew that lie was committing a crime, insanity should not be a valid
defense. It will be noted that the justices did not recognize "irresistible
impulse," or inability to refrain from the criminal action indulged, as any
defense, so long as the actor still retained the ability to distinguish right
from wrong. Moreover, the concept of attenuated responsibility was not
recognized and the psychopathic personality was entirely ignored.1
14. McNaghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200 (H. L. 1843).
15. Ibid.
16. Although one may suppose that the psychopathic personality had not then been
recognized as a psychiatric entity, medical men in England as early as 1829 had demar-
cated the condition from irresponsibility or insanity due to disease. See SAI'SO,, Ciult-
INAL JURISPRUDENCE IN RELATION TO MENTAL ORGANIZATION (1841) 7. Benjamin
Rush, father of American mental science, was one of the first to point out that disorders
of the moral sentiments may be congenital and equivalent to partial imbecility, and he
suggested that "moral imbecility" better described such cises than did the term "moral
insanity." See RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DIsEAsEs or
THE MIND (1812).
I Vol, 52: 58h
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These rules, pronounced with misgivings, did a great deal too under-
mine law-medicine relationships. A host of psychiatrists, such as Emil
Kraepelin, advanced the description of clinical entities in the field olf
psychiatric disorders, but the rules in Mcaqlhtn's case remained static.
They were assaulted by such psychiatrists as Maudsley and criticized by
such criminal law writers as Stephens. They were studied by Select Re-
form Committees in England and impugned in America hy Sheldon Glu-
eck 17 and other criminologists. Yet English courts stead fastly ciontinue
to pay lip service to McNaghtcns rules. 'Most American courts have d ile
likewise, except for those jurisdictions which have broadened the original
categories to include the further exculpatory grtiund tof irresistible im-
pulse of one kind or another. English judges were undoulitedly keenly
aware of the subtle gradations in mental responsibility,1s and we cannit
believe that they had no inkling of the disparity hetween the legal and
medical approach to mental disease. The truth is that Mc.Ytiahten s rules
are not philosophical concepts, but mere products of the moide sof trial
under our adversary system. Lay jurors have long had the respo nsibility
of passing upon the weight and credibility of expert testimnony." Befoore
a lay judge can frame an intelligible charge for the guidance of lay jun irs,
he must be able to carve out some rule-of-thumb classificatitins for cate-
gories which these jurors can apply to the evidence to he valued. Immedi-
ately we import a forced certainty of statement into a realm which is
essentially uncertain and variable.
This practical problem of proof has much to do with the unwillingness
of English courts to embrace the doctrine of irresistible impulse. There
17. See GLUECK. 'MENTAL DISORDERS AND THE CDIMINAL LAW (1925).
18. See HALE. THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROW:N (173t)).
19. In Roman law we find evidence that scientific isues were referred t,. e.pcrt
referees for decision. See D. 25.4.1 pr. References to use of experts in the Rooman legal
texts can be found in WETZELL. SYSTEM DES ORDF.NTLICHEN CIVIL-CCESF;s 1,R78) 52.
n. 11. In canon law it has long been customary for the judge in matrimonial cases involv-
ing alleged impotency or non-consummation of the marriage, to establish the facts Vy
ordering bodily inspection of one or both parties by cuurt-appuinted experts. See GAS-
P. MI. CODEX JURIS CANONICI (1942 ed.).
The early common law provided a writ for a jury uf matrons do vntre instkiciedo in
proper matrimonial causes. (BRAcToN, DE LEG. lib. ii fol. 09). Indeed, thruughuut the
fourteenth century in London, courts used special juries of experts drawn frum a par-
ticular trade to hear causes involving trade disputes. See RIL Y. '.MEroEaALs op Lo:wvo:
AND LONDON LIFE IN THE 13TH, 14TH AL-D 15TH CENTURIES (1S).
These facts are the more significant when we realize that the jur,-rs originally heard
no witnesses and were themselves free to go ahuut investigating the facts kth Itefore and
during the trial. Not until the middle of the fifteenth century did it licz,,-me cub-
tomary to summon witnesses. It was not until after 1600 that the direct and influeutial
use of experts began to succumb to the present evidentiary restrictions, scientific pru A
became merely advisory to the lay jury, and reduced to the status uf pen cmpLtitiun with
lay testimony. See Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regardin, Expert Tcs-
thnony (1901) 15 HARV. L REX'. 40.
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is no doubt that violent disappointments in love and other psychological
pressures can drive a person to inhuman conduct as irresistibly as dis-
ease."0 But English courts have been afraid to get out on these uncharted
seas, where all criteria are dim, and degrees of responsibility are not prov-
able by objective evidence. They have not paid so much regard to the
paralysis of volition, as to the suspected tinge of culpability in allowing
oneself to take the first step. Thus, one who voluntarily partakes of alco-
hol and kills in a drunken rage may, if he lacked the required malice afore-
thought or specific criminal intent, have his offense mitigated from first
to second degree murder or to manslaughter; but in most jurisdictions he
cannot set up his drunken state as a complete defense and thereby gain
acquittal.' If his voluntary intoxication leads to the independent disease
of delirium tremens, and as a result of an automatic state induced thereby,
he kills another, he has a complete defense.2 " The culpable first step
has merged into a disease state which human agency cannot control, and
furthermore there is a guarantee of authenticity when the aberrant men-
tal state is a familiar symptom of a standard disease.
One cannot fairly say that currently the English courts reject "irresis-
tible impulse" in toto; possibly that defense has full vitality in England
in all cases where transient mania, or irresistible impulse, is the explosive
symptom of an ascertainable, pre-existing disease such as delirium tre-
mens, epilepsy, or one of the psychoses.2" It is at the brink of mere psy-
chologic motivation that the Epglish courts draw back, and there is
much to be said for their hesitancy if we orientate rules by practical con-
siderations of sound proof-making.
The conflict we have here between current law and good psychiatry
does not arise from obtuseness of the legal mind, nor from any desire
of law to poach upon medical preserves, but from understandable conse-
quences of trial by jury. Assume lay jurors are to continue trying scien-
tific issues, and you will find a natural and understandable hesitancy about
giving up the pat, albeit illusory certainty of McNaghten's rules. Arrange
for lunacy problems to be delegated to psychiatrists acting as expert ref-
erees, and this delegation will draw after it a conceded right to erect new
20. See PROAL, PASSION AND CRIMINALITY (1906).
21. See Singh, History of the Defence of Drunkenness in English Crininal Law
(1933) 49 L. Q. REv. 528. For American decisions see E. V. R., Intoxication in; Mitlga-
tion of Homicide (1941) 2 Q. J. OF ALCOHOL 396.
22. See Regina v. Davis, 14 Cox Cr. Cas. 563 (1881).
23. Frequently these cases involve such "automatism" as to deprive the actor of knowl-
edge of "the nature and quality of his act," or the mental state is such that experts do not
hesitate to say that the accused was unable "to distinguish right from wrong." Opinions
of the higher English courts have not yet covered irresistible impulse, as a third cate-
gory, in a satisfactory or definitive way. Nevertheless we cannot overlook the fact that
in 1924 the House of Lords defeated Lord Darling's "Criminal Responsibility Bill" in-
tended to establish irresistible impulse due to mental disease as an additional legal defense.
[Vol. 52: 586
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criteria suitable to guide the new trier of fact. In the judicial process,
definitions have but one function-to serve as sign posts for the trier of
fact. Those who would destroy McNaghten's rules should make a flank
attack rather than a frontal assault, by seeking legislation designed to,
make the accredited psychiatrist an expert trier of fact in lunacy issues.
When we turn to the law in action in England, we discover that Mc-
Vaghten's rules do not work oppressively as against a particular defend-
ant. One would imagine that few prisoners could prove a defense of
lunacy. In practice the fact is otherwise, and it would appear that the
jury uses its verdict of "guilty, but insane" in a generous manner, some-
times to save from capital punishment prisoners not believed to be free
agents or grossly culpable in committing the crime. A table issued by
the Committee on Insanity and Crime indicates that from 1901 to 1922
approximately 33 per cent of the persons on trial for murder in England
and Wales were adjudged insane, while 20 per cent of those indicted for
murder in Scotland were declared insane. -4
Even if a defendant has been convicted by a jury due to literal appli-
cation of Mc-aghten's rules, the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 '1 gives
the English Court of Criminal Appeal power to hear new evidence in
reviewing the conviction,2 and the further power to override the jury's
verdict. 7 The court has exercised this jurisdiction sparingly, but it is
a not uncommon thing for the court in affirming the conviction within
the framework of McNaghten's rules to invite intervention by the Home
Secretary.21 Under the Criminal Lunatics Act, 1884,' the flome Sucre-
tary is empowered after conviction and before execution of sentence to
intervene, appoint a committee of medical men to determine the prisoner's
present sanity, and to substitute commitment in an asylum in lieu
of the court penalty. In this investigation, the medical men apply psy-
chiatric standards as they would in studying any other case recommended
for commitment under a lunacy certificate. We now have the somewhat
farcical spectacle in England of courts paying continued lip service to
McNaghten's rules because of respect for precedent and practical prob-
lems of proof raised by jury trial, yet inviting an auxiliary administra-
24. See Report from the Select Committee on Capital Punishment, Houme of Com-
mons (1929-30) 36.
25. 7 Euw. VII, c. 23.
26. Exercised in Rex v. Holt, 15 Cr. App. R. 10 (1920).
27. As in Rex v. Hopper, 11 Cr. App. R. 136 (1915). In Rex v. Beard. 14 Cr. App.
R. 110 (1919), the defendant while intoxicated raped a girl and apparently strangled her
to death by accident. A jury verdict of murder was reduced on appeal to manslaughter
because of error in the trial court's charge.
28. See Rex v. Boss, 16 Cr. App. R. 71 (1921); Rex v. Lumb, 7 Cr. App. R. 2.3
(1912).
29. 47 & 48 VcT., c. 64.
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tive agency to step in and apply modern psychiatric tests after the court
is done.
Unfortunately in many American states we have not been so adroit in
developing escape mechanisms for McNaghten's rules; most often we
have preserved the substance as well as the facade. The time has come in
both countries for recognizing psychiatric appraisal of court cases as a
problem to be farmed out to expert referees.
Medical Criminology and Penology
Despite the deep interest of lawyers and doctors in the basic cause of
crime,3" there has been no national law passed providing for uniform
examinations, consistent classification of offenders, or centralized collec-
tion of statistics analyzing criminal conduct, its antecedents, pattern and
sequelae. Even in the detailed judicial statistics of England one cannot
find such data. There is a need, too, for the medical penologist, since
studies of prison populations should go beyond etiology of crime to the
formation of enlightened decisions regarding proper segregation of prison
inmates and their fitness for parole." At the moment, no one test or ex-
amination seems adequate to provide the desired personality blueprint,
and improvement of methods is one of the central problems in this field.
In going through medical literature, one observes certain recurrent
flaws in many studies dealing with relation of mental defects to crime.
The investigator often fails to enumerate associated mental defects. A
recent patient in Boston City Hospital, who had been in prison several
times, was a chronic epileptic, suffered from delirium tremens from long
indulgence in alcohol, and was a psychopathic personality. Each of these
defects has an independent relation to criminal propensity, and it would
be misleading to list the subject merely as an epileptic. In some cases a
proper doubt may arise as to the adequacy of the test methods. And fre-
quently the investigator does not correlate the particular defect or mental
state with commission of the crime. To be considered significant in point
of etiology, the defect should have been a substantial cause of the dere-
liction. 2
30. See FINK, CAUSES OF CR~iME' (1938).
31. For an excellent study of this type, see Branham, The Classification and Treat-
ient of the Defective Delinquent (1926) 17 J. CRIAt. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 183. For an im-
portant earlier study, see Glueck, A Study of 608 Admissions to Sing Shq Prisot (1918)
2 MENTAL HYGIENE 85. Rockefeller Foundation has carried out important surveys of
prisoners in various institutions of the several states.
32. A model study in this regard is the critical analysis by Dr. W. Norwood East
of the main and subsidiary causes of attempted suicide, based on his personal examina-
tion and investigation of one thousand consecutive cases admitted to Brixton prison, in
England. See EAST, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CRIME (1936) 141.
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It is safe to say that mental disease is very rarely a sole cause i f crim-
inality: 3 That mental defect usually is only one of several multiple causes
of crime is suggested by a rather neat comparison. Various studies shM w
that mental defect has some relation to the etiology of major crimes li
violence in a substantial percentage of cases." Studies of the inmatts of
mental institutions, on the other hand, show a markedly lower incidence
of such behavior. " Part of this difference is due tu repressitin. segrega-
tion. careful guarding by hospital personnel, but much tof it seems fairly
attributable to the fact that the inmate is now unable too bjc. me inlved
in those social transactions which give rise to the multiple stimuli that
propel toward criminal behavior. Protect the lower fraction of the social
structure from the fierce pressure of a competitive system, alleviate the
distorting and disturbing tensions which the less than average pers,,n
feels, treat criminality by curing widespread maladjustments. and it i,
reasonable to believe that there will be a sharp fall in crime and in admi-
sions to mental institutions. Deterioration of the inadequate personality
is partially a symptom of a social organization not fully adapted to pro-
tecting its weaker members.
On the horizons of medical criminology, we can see an approaching
emphasis on functional studies. In 1929, Berger published his first paper
describing the action currents or "brain waves" -riven off continuously
by the cerebral tissue." The electro-encephalogran is a graphic tracing
of these waves which can be made by a competent lahorattory technician,
without risk of injury to the patient. Dr. William Lennox and Dr. F. A.
Gibbs and his wife, among other leading workers, have been amassing
33. See Nolan, Some Characteristics of the Criminal Insane (1420) 5 SmAnz Hoa,-
PITAL Q. 362, for a table showing distribution of crimes amnig clinical diagliv es ,f Oil
persons admitted to an institution for the criminally insane in New York.
34. Dr. A. Warren Stearns, during his tenure as psychiatrist uf NMassachusetts State
Prison, made an intensive study of 100 prisoners, 58 uf whvm had been convicted of man-
slaughter, 39 of second degree murder and 3 of first degree murder. He found that 24
per cent were drunk when the crime was committed, and that "twenty of the .erivs
showed well marked departure from normal mental condition, nine being definitely in-
sane, three feeble-minded, eight presenting personality disorders of ski grss a character
as to limit their responsibility." Stearns, Homicide in Massachusetts ( 19251 4 A'. J. op
PSYCHIATRY 725.
35. See Elwell, Epilepsy as a Defense for Crime (1S90) 9 MjIjicv-L:,xsAL J. 55. El-
well found that very few homicides were committed in the asylums uf Ohio. Ur f other
states, and drew the conclusion that not one out olf a thouand of these whu commit mur-
der are actually insane, but become conveniently afflicted with mental disorder for purposes
of trial. It is interesting to note that Dr. Walter Channing, lespvnding tv the authr
questionnaire, took sharp issue with this opinion and cited experience Uf the New Yorl:
courts in support of his contrary belief that an appreciable percentage Uf humicides are
committed by insane persons. Id. at 61.
36. Berger, Ueber das Elektrenkephalogramin des Menscelwn (1929) 87 Aramo. F.
PSYcHtIAT. 527.
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great numbers of normal and abnormal tracings for some years to the
end of developing criteria of interpretation. Abnormal waves emanat-
ing from a particular region of the brain help localize a suspected brain
tumor. The workers mentioned postulate that epilepsy, one of the most
enigmatic diseases, must be considered to be a cerebral dysrhythmia with
characteristic "brain wave" patterns.
The implications for scientific proof, present and future, of this line
of research should be clear. For instance, we have long known medically
that some persons afflicted with epilepsy may commit violent crimes dur-
ing phases of the disease which momentarily destroy their mental responsi-
bility. The epileptic may commit such a crime during a disoriented state of
"epileptic furore" or frenzy; he may commit it during the post-seizure
"clouded" state when his sensorium is radically deranged but he is never-
theless able to walk and perform actions as in a dream. Again, in lieu
of his usual convulsion or lapse of consciousness, the epileptic may have
a substituted attack called a "psychic equivalent," during whichli he is
temporarily disoriented but may appear outwardly normal except for a
glassy stare, a certain incoherence of speech and slightly incongruous con-
duct. While in the grip of one of these states, the epileptic is subject to
so-called automatism, and may perform involved acts and fairly complex
crimes without insight or power to abstain. We do not understand all
the mental phenomena involved here, but we can say, if the case is
genuine, that the unfortunate perpetrator of the homicide at the time
of his conduct was both unable to appreciate the nature and quality of
his act (the more basic test under McNaghten's rules) and to distinguish
right from wrong.
When the defense of epilepsy is injected, 7 two important problems
of scientific proof arise: (1) is the defendant a true epileptic or is the
37. English cases: Rex v. Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282 (1800) (psychotic dete-
rioration of epilepsy originally due to war head injury; not guilty by reason of insanity) ;
Rex v. Bowler, 54 Annual Register 309 (1812) (convicted) : Rex v. Boss, 16 Cr. App. R. 71
(1921) (conviction affirmed); Rex v. Fryer, 24 Cox Cr. Cas. 403 (1915) (guilty but
insane) ; Rex v. Perry, 14 Cr. App. R. 48 (1919) (conviction affirmed; the epileptic state
must have been operative at the time of the act in such way as to destroy mental re-
sponsibility). See also Berkeley-Hill and Owen, Post-Epileptic Automatism as a Defence
in a Case of Mlurder (1930) 55 J. ROYAL ARnY MED. CoRes 54.
American cases: Commonwealth v. Snyder, 224 Pa. 526, 73 Atl. 910 (1909) (con-
viction affirmed; mere fact that accused was an epileptic creates no presumption of insan-
ity or mental irresponsibility) ; People v. Barberi, 12 N. Y. Cr. R. 89, 423, 47 N. Y. Supp.
168 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (trial court charge: epilepsy must have been operative at time
of act in such way as to destroy mental responsibility of defendant at time lie acted) ;
People v. Magnus, 92 Misc. 80, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (Sup Ct. 1915) (conviction
reversed because undisputed medical testimony showed act was committed during
epileptic seizure) ; Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737 (1910) (con-
viction affirmed; mere proof of epilepsy is not proof of insanity). See also: Olden v.
State, 176 Ala. 6, 58 So. 307 (1912); People v. Tucker, 11 Cal. (2d) 271, 78 P. (2d)
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history of past "fits" fabricated, and (2) assuming the defendant is a
true epileptic, was his epilepsy so operative at the time of the alleged
criminal act as to destroy mental responsibility? Since there are thought
to be 600,000 epileptics in the United States alone, it is easy to see that
an epileptic may commit a deliberate murder during a lucid interval be-
tween seizures and try to escape criminal penalties by falling back on a
false plea that the conduct occurred during a period of "automatism."
The first problem can usually be solved by application of the electro-en-
cephalogram. The prisoner might have no spontaneous seizures during
his surveillance in prison. But in the laboratory he can be asked to hyper-
ventilate (prolonged rapid breathing) or innocuous materials can be given
without risk of bodily injury for the purpose of making the latent epilepsy
patent, so that diagnostic tracings of the peculiar brain waves may be
recorded by the electro-encephalogram. The second question cannot be
answered conclusively in this way, even though the presence of true epi-
lepsy is so established. This is because epileptics are orientated and men-
tally responsible in the interim periods and seizures may be separated by
long intervals."8
It is characteristic of genuine "epileptic" crimes during states of auto-
matism that the actor has an amnesia, or loss of memory, for most or all
of the transaction. One must investigate every circumstance of the crime
and weigh every shred of evidence. Usually such crimes are violent or
brutal, sometimes they are spontaneous, but craftiness may be used. Often
the act is committed without plausible motive, often against a loved one
rather than an enemy, and there is lack of caution as to the time, place
1136 (1938); Taylor v. United States, 7 App. D. C. 27 (1S95) ; Quattlebaum v. State,
119 Ga. 433, 46 S. E. 677 (1904) ; State v. Wright, 112 Iowa 436, 84 N. WV. 541 (1909) ;
Roop v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 828, 258 S. W. 667 (1924); State v. Klinger, 46 Mo.
224 (1870), appeal dism'd, 13 Wall. 257 (U. S. 1871); State v. Hayes, 16 Mo. App.
560 (1885); State v. Pennington, 146 Mo. 27, 47 S. IN. 799 (1S98); State v. Mfaioni,
78 N. J. Law 339, 74 At. 526 (1909) ; State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. Lawr 236, 119 Ad. 15
(1922) ; People v. Furlong, 187 N. Y. 198, 79 N. E. 978 (1907) ; Coffey v. State, CO Tex.
Cr. R. 73, 131 S. V. 216 (1910) ; Zimmerman v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 630, 215 S. %.
101 (1919); Batchan v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. R. 398, 284 S. WV. 549 (1926); State V.
Clark, 156 Vash. 47, 286 Pac. 69 (1930).
38. It must not be assumed that, all epileptics are likely to commit crimes. The
author doubts the authenticity of the "epileptic mechanism" in many cases from medical
literature. Dr. H. Houston Merritt has followed thousands of epileptics in the clinic
and he believes that criminal conduct among these persons is a rare phenomenon. This
is the belief, also, of Dr. Winfred Overholser, well-known forensic psychiatrist. (Per-
sonal communication). Dr. A. Warren Stearns, widely experienced forensic expert, has
come to the conclusion that most alleged epileptic "amnesia" is simulated. (Personal
communication). It is interesting to note that Ernst in studying etiology of crime in
violent criminals concluded that epilepsy was an infrequent factor. ErrxsT, Urx.n Gn-
WALTTAETIGKEITSVERDRECHER UND IHRE NACtYNIMEN (1938).
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or means taken to avoid detection. Some of these indicia of a genuine
epileptic crime may be missing. If one can show that the amnesia is simu-
lated, not genuine, this is persuasive evidence that -the defendant's whole
version of "automatic conduct" is sheer fabrication."
Recently the electro-encephalogram has been used in England in two
murder trials involving the defense of epilepsy. The prisoner had not
experienced convulsive seizures in prison while under surveillance. The
electro-encephalogram, however, proved conclusively that he had the dis-
ease, and this corroborative evidence, coupled with other proof, caused the
jury to return a verdict of "guilty, but insane." 40 We may expect to see
the electro-encephalogram used increasingly in murder trials in an effort
to buttress a plea of insanity by showing the prisoner has grossly abnor-
mal brain waves. Courts must be careful, however, not to permit extrava-
gant claims founded upon uncritical interpretation, for cerebral dysrhyth-
mia is a symptom, and medical science is not yet ready to say what every
given tracing implies.
There are other developments in prospect in the field of medical crim-
inology. The American Prison Association is working toward adoption
of uniform classifications in studying mental defects and diseases of
prisoners. More adequate methodology should be devised, and with the
eventual advent of centralized statistics, comparative data on the relation-
ship of disease to crime will be available. More voluminous court statistics
and special studies by competent medical men or social workers should
narrow the gap of inference by providing trustworthy reconstructions of
the causes of the particular crime, after the fashion of East's able
example." The surge may move forward to the realization of a pro-
fession of medical penology with the opportunities and compensation
desirable to attract the ablest men." Finally, more careful thought should
be given to segregation of prisoners according to behavior patterns, and
their likely interactions, the device of parole should be used more effec-
tually, and far more attention should be given to early discovery of
pre-delinquency and of potentially dangerous psychopathic personalities
so that proper mechanisms for preventing crime can be put into opera-
tion.4"
39. See Lennox, Amnesia, Real and Feigned (1943) 10 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 298, 99
Af. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 732.
40. See Middle Templar, From an English Office Window (1942) 20 CAN B. Rsv.
794, 798.
41. See note 32 supra.
42. See Roche, The Pennsylvania Plan (Intrainural Training in Penal Psychiatry)
[1939] PROc. Ami. PRISON Ass'N 315.





This aspect of scientific proof makes use of the fact that most diseases,
injuries, and irritants produce characteristic changes in the tissues of the
organs or structures affected. These diagnostic changes may be discov-
ered by gross inspection at times, or they may call for preparation of tissue
sections, embedded in paraffin blocks, cut into thin slices, mounted on
slides and so stained as to bring out architectural patterns for study under
the microscope. Pathology, or the morpholog, of body tissues changed
by disease, injury, or irritation, has long been a foundation subject of the
medical curriculum. The forensic pathologist, ideally, is a medical man
who has specialized in pathology in hospital practice until he is able to
diagnose apparent cause of death due to disease. He then has acquired
knowledge of those many special techniques which enable a proper expert
to establish the identification of persons, 44 to estimate the time of death,
to infer the type of weapon used, to distinguish suicide from homicide,
in short, to aid the administration of criminal justice by an expert opinion
regarding "how, when and by what means the decedent came to his death
or injury."
Most of these studies presuppose a post-mortem examination of a dead
body, but actually the contribution of forensic pathology includes a wide
range of clinical and laboratory tests which might be applied in other
cases. Properly drawn laws would call this science into broader play in
non-fatal injuries or accidents. Who, for instance, is apt to have a more
reliable grasp of the relationship of trauma to disease than the patholo-
gist? In many medico-legal cases where the nature of a disease is in
doubt, we turn to the pathologist to find the answer by studying a lymph
node or other bit of tissue invaded by the disease. This diagnostic speci-
men is obtained by the virtually riskless expedient of removing a sample
of test material from the patient by the minor procedure known as
"biopsy." The probative value of such evidence is so high that in all those
usual cases where the surgical risk is trivial, persons who claim to suffer
from cancer as a result of injury probably should be required to submit to
diagnostic biopsy as a reasonable requirement of proving the disease.
At the moment, forensic pathology is highly developed in some quarters
as a scientific pursuit, but its proper application is crippled by the fact that
its legal utilization is through the antiquated coroner's office. In seven
44. Following the tragic Cocoanut Grove fire in Bostun (Novembir, 1942) medical
examiners were confronted with the task of identifying scores of charred bodies. Their
ability to do this within a very brief period of time was an amazing feat. Certain wo-
men burned beyond recognition were successfully identified by the length of time they
had been pregnant.
45. The pathologist is able by-virtue of his training and the techniques at his com-
mand, to study progressive tissue reactions which follow single or repeated traumatic
stimuli.
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of our American jurisdictions, modern medical examiner systems have
been established by law." These are not identical, but under the ideal
mechanism, approached in New York City, the forensic pathologist gains
paramount right of investigation in a broad category of cases where death
has resulted from accident, casualty, or under unusual or suspicious cir-
cumstances. He is able to move forward with alacrity, to take charge of
the body and the perishable evidence in the environment, and to give
numberless scientific aids to investigating police officers.
In forty-one American states and in England, the coroner's office is
still used to investigate such cases. In England since 1926, only medical
men or lawyers are eligible to serve as coroners, but in the United States,
this official is usually a layman, not infrequently simultaneously holding
the office of justice of the peace. The lay coroner cannot personally per-
form those scientific duties of investigation which his office requires, and
decisive scientific evidence is often lost through delay or oversight. The
status of the coroner, as a quasi-judicial officer, has been anomalous and
abortive since the office was first conceived. The coroner functions by
holding an inquest, and usually must impanel a jury, but the verdict of
the coroner or of his jury is of no real legal consequence, for it cannot
be offered in evidence in a subsequent prosecution for homicide " or in
an independent civil action brought on an insurance policy where "suicide
or natural death" might be a controlling issue.4
It is surprising that we have not brought the important science of foren-
sic pathology into more extensive use, for many vital civil and criminal
law questions turn upon the fact and circumstances of death, and histori-
cally investigation of death was one of the first law-medicine cooperations
to be accented." Without much more ignominious delay, doctors and
lawyers must push forward to an ideal "medical examiner act" in each
state. Today the coroner's jurisdiction is narrow and perilous, for if lie
orders a post-mortem examination in any case except where he has rea-
sonable grounds to suspect death by criminal violence, he is liable in dam-
ages to the next of kin for wrongful autopsy." In the future, the medical
46. Massachusetts; New York City; Newark, New Jersey; Maine; Maryland; Con-
necticut; Rhode Island.
47. See Hall v. State, 137 Ala. 44, 34 So. 680 (1903) ; Blackwell v. State, 166
Miss. 524, 146 So. 628 (1933) ; State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938 (1918) ;
Hedger v. State, 144 Wis. 279, 128 N. W. 80 (1910).
48. See Boehme v. Sovereign Camp, 98 Tex. 376, 84 S. W. 422 (1905).
49. See MacAlister's writings on the history of medicine in 17 PRoc. ROYAL Soc.
MED. (1924). See also, VON BAR, HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW (1916)
208; ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, INSTITUTES OF LEGAL MEDICINE IN METHODS AND PROD-
LEMS OF MEDICAL EDUCATION (9th ser. 1928).
50. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Love, 132 Tex. 280, 121 S. W. (2d) 986
(1938) (liable for ordering post-mortem examination to determine cause of obscure death
in aid of workmen's compensation insurance investigation) ; Gurganious v. Simpson, 213
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examiner should be given a broad discretion as to those fatal or non-fatal
cases which he might investigate in aid of criminal or civil litigation.
Already many workmen's compensation acts empower commissioners to
order autopsies where the cause of death is obscure and further light is
needed to determine compensability of an alleged injury. An efficiently
operated medical examiner system need not cost substantially more than
the coroner's office. Probably the desirable goal is a compact organiza-
tion of forensic pathologists, financed as a state agency, with stations in
a few metropolitan centers, so that the staff could serve as consultants in
obscure cases. Ordinary cases of sudden death could be passed upon by
local physicians. Such a medical examiner's office could maintain a func-
tional cooperation with a state scientific crime detection laboratory, as both
agencies are auxiliary aids to police and law enforcement efforts.
SCIENTIFIC MODES AND MEcIANISMS OF PROOF
There is real danger in the fetching term "scientific proof," for it may
lead us to overconcentrate on the high probative value of this species of
evidence, while glossing over serious dangers which lurk in its use.
"Scientific proof" covers a vast range of expert testimony, varying wide-
ly in probative value. Certain methods of identification, such as finger-
printing, contain only a minute chance of error, either as regards premises
employed or actual execution of tests. Next we drop down to such activi-
ties as forensic chemistry and blood group work, where premises are
scientific, but errors in procedure are more likely. Here there is real risk
of mistake if the witness does not have very special qualifications. Hand-
writing falls a little lower down the scale. Forensic pathology holds its
own, in probative value, with other trustworthy identification methods.
Clinical forensic medicine is a blending of science and art, naturally more
amenable to method in diagnosis than in prognosis, where facts must be
aided by experience and good opinion.
In times past I have suggested the formation of a National Scientific
Commission to serve as a master censor for the courts.,' Such a body,
made up of qualified legal and scientific persons, could probe into the
merits of each species of scientific proof and lay down appropriate criteria,
safeguards and cross-checks needed to make the evidence trustworthy.
The several states could pass statutes providing that scientific evidence
which conforms to requirements of the National Scientific Commission
is to be admitted as prima facie evidence in any legal proceeding where
it is relevant. Such a body could also develop a comprehensive system
for certifying the proficiency of expert witnesses.
N. C 613, 197 S. E. 163 (1938) (liable for autopsy on boy drowned in Y. IN. C. A. FpA,
there being no suspicion of foul play).
51. Smith, Cooperation Between Law avzd Sdence in Scientific Proof (1941) 19
TEx. L. REv. 414.
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In respect to every species of expert testimony, there is a need for cri-
teria, defining what is possible, what is impossible, and what is acceptable
practice, but their development has been restricted chiefly to problems
of identification. It is not uncommon to see "experts" making blood group
determinations by such impossible methods as microscopic inspection of
dried blood smears. It is not a rare thing to see general practitioners postu-
lating injury as the probable cause of some disease, when current medical
science would not accept the evidence relied upon as satisfactory.
Each species of evidence calls for safeguards, cross-checks and its
own particular criteria of proof if we are to avoid losing the contri-
bution of science in a welter of opinion. In all those cases where the
proposed expert needs special indoctrination and training, a certificate
of proficiency should be required before he is allowed to testify. If evi-
dence is to be founded upon test materials, provision should be made for
preservation of this material for independent corroboration studies to
settle doubts that might arise in the mind of court or adversary. Lack
of any such mechanisms may account for the willingness of courts to say
that even if scientific evidence is undisputed, the jury may rely on contrary
lay evidence to enter a verdict contrary to the scientific proof." Perhaps
the particular expert does not look too scientific to the court; perhaps,
too, the judge feels that no satisfactory cross-examination of a compli-
cated procedure is possible. It is well-known that most lawyers are not
equipped to overthrow this species of evidence, and the danger is en-
hanced by the fact that a fundamental error may be merged beyond dis-
covery in the standardized routine of a text-book procedure. If the test
material were saved, as usually is possible, the trial court could appoint
an impartial expert to repeat the procedure or study. If results were con-
sistent, and the scientific evidence were conclusive of the issue, many
trial courts would refuse to permit the jury to override such findings.
52. In Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. (2d) 428, 74 P. (2d) 1043 (1937), scientific
evidence based on blood group determinations was uncontradicted that defendant could
not be the father of plaintiff's child. The trial court refused to instruct a verdict for de-
fendant and on the strength of lay testimony the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff,
finding the defendant to be the father of her child. This judgment was affirmed by the
California Supreme Court. In like manner, in Rex v. True. 127 L. T. R. 561 (Ct. Cr. App.
1922), the Court of Criminal Appeal in England held that a jury was entitled to find
that a defendant, under prosecution for murder, was sane at the time he committed the
homicide, despite uncontradicted medical testimony to the contrary. Compare, however,
Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 218 (1942), where the plaintiff sought a divorce
from his wife on the ground of adultery. The wife contended that a child was the off-
spring of the plaintiff and that she had not committed adultery. An expert witness offered
uncontradicted testimony that he had performed blood group determinations which
showed that the plaintiff could not possibly be the father of the child. The court held
that although "the presumption of legitimacy of a child . . .born in wedlock is . . .
one of the strongest presumptions known to law . . ." it was rebutted, and the lay tes-
timony of access overcome by the undisputed scientific evidence of non-paternity.
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One result of our present adversary system of trial is that science may
be born anew in every lawsuit in which two experts disagree. That a
scientific principle or finding can be true in A's case and untrue in B's
case is squarely opposed to the concept of the universality of scientific
truth.'3 In more progressive states, if the case turns on a scientific ques-
tion, and expert X gives uncontradicted testimony that the facts are ABC,
the trial judge will instruct the jury that they must return a verdict finding
the facts to be ABC." If, however, expert Y disagrees with expert X,
the lay jurors are to say which is the preferable view, or to discard both
in favor of lay testimony. These are the mechanisms of procedure and
trial. Any person would be properly shocked, however, if a diagnosis
were conducted along similar lines in a modern hospital.
It will be noted that I press always for the conviction that laymen can-
not successfully try scientific issues. The layman is apt to import distorted
notions of scientific matters into the judging process, and the warping
effect is as pernicious whether he gives excessive weight to the evidence
or too little. Three cardinal aspects of evidence are relevancy, probative
value and persuasive value. For a perfectly competent, expert trier of
fact, probative value and persuasive value should le the same. The lay-
man naturally cannot grade scientific evidence according to its true pro-
bative value, and in consequence he is more convinced by the persuasive
or psychological appeal of evidence.0
Assuming, as we must, that laymen will continue to try scientific issues
for a long while to come, is it possible to make criteria of scientific proof
53. In criminal litigation where a scientific finding should control the outcome of
the case, and the undisputed scientific evidence points one way, a constitutional amend-
ment empowering the trial judge to instruct the jury to return its verdict in accordance
with the scientific proof would seem to be the only solution to the jury trial dilemma.
In states where the court has power to appoint an impartial expert, supplementary legis-
lation might be warranted providing that the scientific findings established in the first
trial shall be binding in subsequent litigation arising out of the same general transaction.
54. I think it is safe to say that this is not yet the majority rule.
55. No more striking case could be mentioned than -Mathews v. People, S9 Colo. 421,
3 P. (2d) 409 (1931). Accused was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for
having murdered his wife. The vital proof was scientific testimony of a ballistics expert
that bullets recovered from the body of decedent were fired from a pistol which defendant
admittedly had in his possession continuously. The accused was a respectable citizen and
offered an alibi. On the trial the ballistics expert vras allowed to pass the bullets among
the jurors who were permitted to look through a hand lens at grouves on the death
bullets in determining identity of the pattern with grooves on test bullets fired through
the barrel of the recovered pistol. After the jurors by this dangerously unscientific grocs
inspection satisfied themselves that the same gun fired both bullets and found accused
guilty, the appeal court undertook to determine the scientific issue for themselves. The
learned members of that tribunal inspected the bullets sent up with the record, admittedly
used a different lens from that employed by the jurors, and held that no such grooves
were present as would warrant the conviction. On this ground they reversed the judg-
ment.
56. See Smith, Components of Proof in Legal Proceedings (1942) 51 Y=ui L J. 537.
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universally available in the "valuing" process, even when these have not
been put in evidence? Facts not offered in evidence from the witness
stand cannot be considered unless they are proper subjects for judicial
notice, and so notoriously known that the court may dispense with the
formality of their proof. The doctrine of judicial notice may enable appeal
courts to tap new and authoritative criteria of scientific proof pronounced
by leading spokesmen of medicine and the sciences. This would give to
such courts a needed measuring rod to determine whether the expert tes-
timony put forward at the trial was sufficient to support the verdict, thus
enabling a more delicate valuation than that afforded by the crude "con-
flict of testimony" test. The chief difficulty here would lie in the judge
consulting the wrong bootblack, 7 but if we are to continue our present
system of trial, this would seem to be a lesser evil than cutting the judge
off from any usable erudition in his difficult task of appraising expert tes-
timony. The higher the authority for these scientific criteria, the less the
risk and the more easily is the doctrine of judicial notice invoked; and
these facts, again, argue for some new official commission or point of
reference.
57. This problem has arisen in malpractice actions filed by patients against their
physicians for alleged mismanagement of fracture cases. Some courts have held that
failure to employ the X-ray in fracture cases is negligence, and that it is so commonly
recognized as such that the court will take judicial notice of the fact even though plain-
tiff offers no expert testimony to prove that the omission in the particular case was a
departure from average medical standards in the community. See Whitson v. Hillis,
55 N. D. 797, 215 N. W. 480 (1927). But cf. Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P. (2d)
455 (1938). This shows the possible dangers of applying the doctrine of judicial notice
to situations which depend on variable circumstances. The English courts have wisely
refused to apply judicial notice to diagnostic use of the X-ray. In Sabapathi v. Hunt-
ley, 1 W. W. R. 817 (1938), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that
whether medical standards require examination in a suspected fracture case calls for
expert testimony since the question depends on varied circumstances such as condition
of the patient, character of the injuries and accessibility of apparatus.
[Vol. 52: 586
